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Abstract
Ever since 2004 companies located in Member States of the European Economic Area have been
able to opt to incorporate in a supranational legal form, the Societas Europaea. We found that
companies located in Member States where the Societas Europaea offers additional legal arbitrage
opportunities beneﬁt most. Moreover, our results show that the stock price reaction is positive
when the decision to incorporate as an Societas Europaea involves moving the ﬁrm’s registered
ofﬁce and that ﬁrms are moving to jurisdictions with signiﬁcantly lower corporate tax rates.
Finally, we found evidence of uncertainty at the registration date but not at the time of the
shareholder meeting.
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Introduction
The European Company (Societas Europaea or SE) has been an essential element for
establishing the Common Market. Ever since 2004 companies located in European
Economic Area Member States have the option to reincorporate as an SE. The SE offers
new ways to shape ﬁrms’ corporate governance structure that are not possible under
national corporate law in some of the European Economic Area Member States. The two
most important differences concern board structure and board-level worker representation.
Both options affect the ﬁrm’s value if they help to mitigate conﬂicts of interests between
management and shareholders (Belot et al., 2014). In this article, we examine whether incor-
porating as an SE affects a ﬁrm’s value and which factors drive these changes.
While a recent body of academic literature has emerged on the SE, many questions
remain open, especially with regard to the economic and ﬁnancial impact of forming an
SE. Without formally testing its impact, legal scholars have argued that an important
reason for reincorporating into an SE is legal arbitrage (Eidenmüller et al., 2009;
Enriques, 2004; Reichert, 2008). Companies located in countries with legal rules that
are particularly favourable to worker representation may choose to become an SE as a
way to restrict board-level worker participation that is otherwise mandatory under
national co-determination laws. By requiring negotiations about worker participation,
the SE structure offers greater ﬂexibility in shaping board-level worker participation away
from the strict national conditions.
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for their comments on an earlier draft of this article as well as the participants in the World Finance Conference (Cagliari
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Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (University of Trier).
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Little is known about how exploiting the SE as a vehicle for legal arbitrage changes a
ﬁrm’s value. Two early studies by Eidenmüller et al. (2009) and Lamp (2011) found no ev-
idence that incorporating under European law overall affects a ﬁrm’s value. This lack of
ﬁndings in the previous literature on SE formations may be due to a lack of statistical power
(MacKinlay, 1997), since both studies used rather small samples. Moreover, because of the
limited usage of the SE in some countries, many hypotheses about legal arbitrage activities
could not be tested hitherto. Now, 11 years after Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001
on the Statute for a European Company became effective on 8 October 2004, we have ac-
cess to a larger sample with many more cases of SE reincorporation from a large range of
countries, which allows us to extend the previous literature by investigating additional hy-
potheses on legal arbitrage activities and their effect on a ﬁrm’s value.
To examine the stock price reaction to public information1 releases on the reincorporation
as an SE, we use data from the European Companies Database maintained by the European
Trade Union Institute (ETUI). Our sample spans from 8 October 2004 until 8 October 2015
and is enriched with hand-collected information on announcement dates from Factiva,
Google searches and company websites. Based on our ﬁnal sample of reincorporated pub-
licly listed ﬁrms, we obtained the following results. We found that country-level as well
as company-level characteristics affect the stock price reaction at the time when the ﬁrst in-
formation about the reincorporation is released. At that time, companies located in countries
that allow only the two-tier board structure under national corporate law experience an
abnormal stock return of around 2%. Similarly, companies located in countries with high
levels of board-level worker participation have larger positive stock price reactions than
those located in countries with traditionally low worker participation requirements.
Company-speciﬁc reasons for opting for an SE also lead to signiﬁcant abnormal stock
returns. Companies that adopt the SE structure in order to relocate the registered ofﬁce to
another European country (which was generally not possible until the merger directive
was enacted in 2005) experience a 2–3% abnormal stock price increase at the time when
the ﬁrst public information about the SE incorporation is released.
Interestingly, we document a second signiﬁcant stock price reaction of equivalent magni-
tude at the time when the company is formally registered for many of the same factors, con-
sistent with the notion that the ﬁrst public information about the reincorporation still contains
signiﬁcant uncertainty about the registration of the SE. Our results suggest that this uncer-
tainty is not driven by the fact that the reincorporation needs to be approved by shareholders
– we found no evidence of an additional stock price reaction at the time of the shareholder
meeting, where shareholders may reject the plan of the management to incorporate as an
SE. Instead, it is caused by the uncertainty over the registration, which must be approved
by a register court. However, we discuss other reasons for this additional effect on stock
prices at the time of registration, as stakeholders such as debt holders and opposing minority
shareholders may block the registration in cases where it involves a relocation of the regis-
tered ofﬁce, even though shareholders have (conditionally) approved the decision to do so.
The study that is closest to ours is the one by Eidenmüller et al. (2010) that examines
whether the market reacts to the announcement of an SE incorporation. We extend this
1In this study we use the term public information instead of public announcement as the information in some cases does not
stem from a formal press release or an ad hoc message of companies themselves but from a broad range of other sources
through which information was leaked to the market and reported by the news.
Lars Hornuf, Abdulkadir Mohamed and Armin Schwienbacher660
© 2019 The Authors JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
study in two important ways. First, while Eidenmüller et al. (2010) test the impact of the
stock price reaction on average, they do not examine which factors affect changes in the
stock price. As we discuss below, we examine the effect of regulatory differences be-
tween the SE regulation and national corporate laws to help explain the price reaction.
Second, we investigate whether the price reaction is affected by remaining uncertainty
after the ﬁrst information is released by extending the analysis to two further, potentially
important events: (1) the shareholder meeting where shareholders vote on the decision to
reincorporate as an SE and (2) the formal date of registration.
The second closely related study is one by Belot et al. (2014). These authors assess the
differential economic impact between one-tier and two-tier boards, using data on France
where companies are free to contract on board structure. The SE regulation offers the
same choice to companies outside France, even if the respective national corporate law
does not offer such a choice. The authors conclude that company characteristics matter.
One-tier boards (the primary structure used in the UK) tend to be used by ﬁrms prone
to signiﬁcant information asymmetries, while ﬁrms with two-tier boards have higher risks
of managerial rent extractions (Belot et al. 2014). These ﬁndings are consistent with the
view that two-tier boards provide better monitoring capabilities. They further suggest that
a convergence to a unique board system is unlikely, as each board structure has its own
costs and merits. Our results are consistent with this conclusion, since we found that only
a fraction of the reincorporation leads to changes in board structure. Moreover, our
analysis documents corporate governance changes other than board structure, including
the relocation of registered ofﬁce and changes in board-level worker participation. These
factors are important and ignoring them could lead to omitted variable problems.
Earlier studies examined the economic impact of worker participation on productivity
measures. FitzRoy and Kraft (2005) as well as Renaud (2007) found that worker
participation increases corporate productivity, while Gurdon and Rai (1990) and FitzRoy
and Kraft (1993) found the opposite to be true. The effect of worker participation on the mar-
ket value of companies is also mixed (Benelli et al., 1987; Gorton and Schmid, 2004). The SE
provides a newway to investigate the effect of worker participation because it offers an option
for managers and employees to negotiate a ﬁrm-speciﬁc employee involvement regime,
which provides a potentially valuable corporate governance feature (Eidenmüller et al., 2012).
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section I describes the Regulation
on the Statute for a European Company and develops testable hypotheses. Section II
presents data and summary statistics on the sample used. The main results are presented
in section III and the conclusion follows.
I. Regulation and Hypotheses
The Regulation of the SE
Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company became
effective on 8 October 2004. It enables companies incorporated in one of the European
Economic Area Member States to adopt a supranational company structure that partly
substitutes and partly supplements the national one. The SE regulation was supplemented
by Council Directive 2001/86/EC, which regulates the involvement of employees. Thus,
the introduction of the SE has generated a multilayer regulatory situation for corporate
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law, where companies can now choose between supranational and national law. An
important beneﬁt of the SE is that it allows companies to operate across different EU
Member States under a single legal statute that is recognized in all Member States.
There exist ﬁve different ways to incorporate as an SE, which generally require a trans-
national link. The new legal form can be achieved through a merger of two companies
from two different Member States, where the merged entity can take the structure of an
SE. Another way is by creating a European holding company with at least two companies
originating from different EU Member States. An SE may also be used in the incorpora-
tion of a common subsidiary held by at least two companies from different EU Member
States, in which case the subsidiary takes the form of the SE. Moreover, a company may
seek a direct transformation into an SE if it held a subsidiary in another Member State for
at least 2 years. Finally, established SEs can form a direct SE subsidiary.
A key condition for incorporating as an SE is that an agreement is reached with
employees for co-determination (Eidenmüller et al., 2012; Rose, 2007). Since the SE
offers the possibility of negotiating with employees this can be an attractive legal form
in countries with mandatory board-level worker participation. The companies can then
negotiate for a more efﬁcient employee representation than the one that exists under
national law. Moreover, European Economic Area Member States either impose one-tier
or two-tier, or, in some rare cases, both board structures for national companies. The SE
generally offers a choice between dualism and monism.
Incorporation as an SE may lead to an increase in the ﬁrm’s value for at least two dif-
ferent reasons. One is the arbitrage opportunities that arise at the country level when the
SE structure enables corporate governance structures that are not allowed under national
corporate law. For example, German national corporate law permits only the two-tier
board structure, while the SE allows for both. This leads to legal arbitrage opportunities
for German companies adopting the SE. The other source of ﬁrm value creation results
from concrete company-speciﬁc decisions that are related to the reincorporation, which
may generate a stock market reaction. In the remainder of this section we formulate
testable hypotheses on these two sources of stock price reaction.
Country-level Effects
As a ﬁrst set of determinants we consider country-level effects as a result of the new legal
opportunities opened up. Indeed, for companies in many countries the possibility of
choosing the supranational legal form enables new corporate governance structures that
were not permitted under national corporate law. We expected an increase in the ﬁrm’s
value for companies located in these countries.
As shown above, the SE regulation generally provides additional ﬂexibility in corpo-
rate governance structures in some EU Member States. Belot et al. (2014) hypothesized
and found that the one-tier board offers beneﬁts in terms of mitigating information asym-
metry problems, while a two-tier board is more efﬁcient for companies with high risks of
managerial rent extractions, because this type of board limits discretion of management in
the company. Given that both governance structures may have merits, we expected the
value of ﬁrms to increase if this option becomes available to them, which we summarize
in Hypothesis 1:
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Hypothesis 1: (monism only/dualism only): Companies located in a country that allows
only the one-tier or two-tier board structure under national corporate law will experience
a positive abnormal return at the time when the ﬁrst public information about the reincor-
poration leaks to the market.
Similarly, we expected the greater ﬂexibility in shaping board-level worker participa-
tion to beneﬁt companies that are restricted under national corporate law, as they may
now choose what is optimal for them. Before the introduction of the SE, they were
constrained on the extent of worker participation, which may have forced many ﬁrms
to adopt suboptimal solutions:
Hypothesis 2: (board-level worker participation): Companies located in a country with
strong worker participation under national law will experience a positive abnormal return
at the time the ﬁrst public information about the reincorporation leaks to the market.
Company-level Effects
Besides beneﬁts due to more legal ﬂexibility in the corporate governance structures as a
result of the introduction of the supranational legal form, we expect companies to beneﬁt
only if they actually make use of these possibilities. In this study, we considered the three
arguably most important corporate decisions that are possible under the SE regulation and
the impact these corporate governance features have on the newly incorporated SE.
The ﬁrst such effect may come from the decision to relocate the registered ofﬁce to an-
other Member State, something that was not permitted before the SE regulation became
effective. Companies may transfer their registered ofﬁce for various reasons. Enriques
(2004) argues that two motives may be to shop for a more favourable corporate law or
tax law regime. Regardless of the ultimate reason, we assume that companies change their
registered ofﬁce only when it is optimal to do so. In the empirical analysis in section III,
we explored the tax motive in more detail. Generally, we expected the transfer of the reg-
istered ofﬁce to increase performance; otherwise such decision has no value to the ﬁrms
and thus ﬁrms would not undertake this step in the ﬁrst place:
Hypothesis 3: (transfer of registered ofﬁce): Companies transferring their registered ofﬁce
will experience a positive abnormal return at the time the ﬁrst public information about
the reincorporation leaks to the market.
Two other important changes in corporate governance that can be absorbed when in-
corporating as an SE are changes in the board structure and freezing worker participation.
While only few European jurisdictions provide companies with the option to choose
between the one-tier and the two-tier board structure, the SE regulation offers companies
a choice between the two systems. This additional choice may increase the value of com-
panies that now ﬁnd a better ﬁt regarding their board structure. Given that we were not
aware of a single ﬁrm in our sample that has changed their board structure from the
one-tier to the two-tier board, we focused only on the new legal possibility to change
the board structure from the two-tier to the one-tier board. This ﬁnding is in line with
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Eidenmüller et al. (2009), who conjecture that companies that can choose the one-tier
board structure should incur lower direct costs because only a single corporate body is in-
volved. Moreover, the level of board-level worker participation not only has to be nego-
tiated ex ante under the legal form of the SE, the pre-existing level of worker participation
most often also remains unchanged ex post because the SE is not subject to the enhanced
worker participation requirements stipulated under national law (Eidenmüller et al., 2009;
Reichert, 2008). Hence, companies just below a certain national size threshold to be eli-
gible for enhanced worker participation may freeze the current extent or even the non-
existence of worker participation at the board level by using the SE.
Again, we expected only companies for which it was optimal to undertake these trans-
formations to do so. This leads to the following two additional hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: (from dualism to monism): Companies changing their board structure from a
two-tier to a one-tier board will experience a positive abnormal return at the time the ﬁrst
public information about the reincorporation leaks to the market.
Hypothesis 5: (freezing worker participation): Companies deciding to freeze worker partic-
ipation will experience a positive abnormal return at the time the ﬁrst public information
about the reincorporation leaks to the market.
Corporate and Legal Uncertainty Resolution
A worthwhile follow-up question that we investigate is whether there is a second stock
price reaction either at the time of the shareholder meeting or at the time of the formal
registration, as the ﬁrst public information about the reincorporation may still entail un-
certainty about whether the ﬁrm will indeed eventually incorporate as an SE. Moreover,
Bratton et al. (2009) argue that the beneﬁts of the SE itself are generally uncertain, since
they involve indirect costs and other legal barriers. This is particularly true for a change of
the registered ofﬁce, which may trigger taxes on hidden reserves and confront manage-
ment with different legal cultures. Therefore, shareholders may vote against such a
change of the registered ofﬁce at the shareholder meeting.
Similarly, the SE incorporation may be blocked at the time of formal registration. For
example, the almost ﬁrst German SE incorporation, Zoll Pool Hafen Hamburg SE, was
ultimately not registered under the new legal form following a protest by the register
judge who argued that, although the SE presumably would not have had any employees,
negotiations on the employee involvement regime had to take place (Seibt, 2005). Like-
wise, after 13 investors of Allianz SE ﬁled a lawsuit challenging the reincorporation
and the merger with the Italian RAS Holding, the ﬁrm had to pay almost €1 million
and had to explain publicly the legal differences between the traditional German AG
and the SE to investors.2 A ﬁnal example concerns opposing minority shareholders,
who may under national law have the right to be paid out if the company transfers its
2http://notizen.duslaw.de/das-teuerste-juraskript-aller-zeiten-allianz-erlautert-die-se/ (last accessed 8 September 2016).
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registered ofﬁce. For example, shareholders of Euroﬁns Scientiﬁc SE, a French pharma-
ceutical testing company that moved to Luxembourg in 2012, approved the transfer of the
registered ofﬁce on condition that the overall volume of payouts to opposing minority
shareholders resulting from the SE reincorporation remained reasonable.3 If the company
ran into liquidity problems, management would have had the responsibility to reconsider
the reincorporation decision before the SE was formally registered. While shareholders
had not speciﬁed what a reasonable volume of payout was, in some other cases share-
holders set clear limits on the volume of payouts that was acceptable.
If no uncertainty remained after the ﬁrst public information about the reincorporation leaks
to the market, in efﬁcient markets no further stock price reaction should occur at the time of
the shareholder meeting or formal registration. In contrast, any signiﬁcant stock price reaction
at the time of the shareholder meeting or formal registration would be attributed to the
resolution of remaining uncertainty. In the analysis below we therefore performed statistical
tests on three events: ﬁrst public information, the shareholder meeting and incorporation.
II. Data and Summary Statistics
To examine our research question, we used the European companies (SE) database of the
European Trade Union Institute, which provides the full population of SEs from 2004 to
today. The data were extracted on 15 October 2015 and cover the period from 8 October
2004 to 8 October 2015. The database includes not only established SEs but also an-
nounced ones. Due to the nature of our research design and the fact that we calculated
the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using three different event dates, we restrict
our analysis to publicly traded ﬁrms that had been SE candidates.
To be included in the sample, we required that (1) the date of the ﬁrst public information
about the reincorporation could be identiﬁed and (2) stock prices data were available to
calculate the CARs for a minimum of 46days prior to the ﬁrst public information about
the reincorporation. Thus, wemanually searched for the international securities identiﬁcation
number (ISIN) code of each company or its predecessors in our database. From the ISIN
codewe then extracted stock prices and accounting data fromThomson Reuters’Datastream.
After we applied this ﬁlter, 159 companies remained, of which 75 were from Germany, 28
from the Czech Republic, 21 from France, eight from the Netherlands, six from Luxemburg,
four from Hungary and 10 from other European countries including the UK.4
We manually searched for each company’s ﬁrst public information about their reincor-
poration using the Factiva database. Factiva collects information worldwide from nearly
200 countries using a large variety of leading newspapers, magazines, trade press,
newswires, press releases, web media, social media and multimedia. We also use a Goo-
gle search and company websites to identify news releases that might not be covered by
the database. We treat an SE incorporation as public information if news on Factiva,
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc-Publizität, a Google search or the company website
mentioned an SE incorporation or the clear intention to do so. We further hand-collected
3https://www.boursorama.com/bourse/actualites/euroﬁns-scientiﬁc-l-assemblee-generale-des-actionnaires-d-euroﬁns-scientiﬁc-se-
a-approuve-le-projet-de-transfert-du-siege-social-au-luxembourg-12149cd9732a40e972e4ac08c3390294 (last accessed 7 De-
cember 2018)
4See Eidenmüller and Lasák (2012) showing that the large number of Czech SEs is mainly driven by the desire to reduce
board size and to beneﬁt from the European image of the SE.
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data on the actual board structure from the company websites and annual reports. Data on
national corporate and worker participation laws was obtained from Conchon et al.
(2015). All variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. The data on the date of the shareholder
meeting were ﬁrst retrieved from the company websites and annual reports. In some
cases, we also had to rely on news reports on the shareholders meeting date. For the date
of registration, we used the ofﬁcial gazettes in the respective country as our main data
source and in rare cases also relied on the sources just mentioned.
We rely on the CAR methodology to assess the stock price reaction, using the market
model for calculating abnormal returns (Brown and Warner, 1985). This methodology is
widely used in event studies, which is also the empirical framework we use in the current
study. Following the literature (Brown and Warner, 1985), we used the (3,+3) window
for calculating CAR values, but also performed robustness checks with different
windows. The parameters of the market model are estimated over a 214-trading day win-
dow, ending 16 trading days before the event day. We used the MSCI Europe index as a
benchmark market portfolio. This index captures ﬁrms with large and medium market
capitalization in Europe. We required at least 30 daily stock returns in the estimation pe-
riod to estimate the parameters used to calculate CARs. We stopped our estimation period
16days before the day of the ﬁrst public information about the reincorporation. The same
procedure was used to calculate CARs for the shareholders meeting and the formal
registration. We did this to avoid bias in the parameters estimations due to changes in
the ﬁrm’s characteristics around the event date. This approach is consistent with previous
studies that follow this methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985).
As a ﬁrst step to investigate the stock price reactions with regard to the SE formation,
we ﬁrst calculated average CARs around the time the ﬁrst information leaked to the
market. The CARs are estimated over different sequences, as reported in Table 1, Panel A.
Our ﬁrst set of tests shows that the market reacts positively around the SE formation,
speciﬁcally 10days (5,+5) around the event date. Although the reaction is generally
positive in a short window such as (1,+1) or (2,+2), the results are statistically
signiﬁcant over a long window (5,+5) only. The second set of results shows that the
CARs are on average positive, but only weakly statistically signiﬁcant at day 0. The third
set of the results shows that the CARs are on average positive and signiﬁcant for the
window (0,+5). Finally, we found that in the long run the CARs are on average positive
and statistically signiﬁcant after the event date for the ﬁrst 100-day window but not the
200-day window.
Together the results show that the market reacts positively to SE formation at the time
the ﬁrst public information about the reincorporation leaks to the market. However, the
reactions are mainly statistically signiﬁcant for the days following the ﬁrst public informa-
tion, although no speciﬁc day stands out as driving the stock price reaction. This suggests
that there is no information leakage or rumours on the SE formation prior to the ﬁrst for-
mal information about the reincorporation becomes public knowledge, but also that there
is strong heterogeneity in the companies in our sample.
Incorporation as an SE requires that shareholders approve the change in legal form.
Given that shareholders might reject the proposal, some uncertainty persists, so that we
might observe a second stock price reaction at the time of the shareholder meeting. We
do not report the statistics for the days around the shareholder meeting where the formal
decision to reincorporate is made, because no event window is statistically signiﬁcant.
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Since there is almost no overlap with the ﬁrst public information (fewer than 5% of the
events overlap), this suggests that the market reacts mostly at the time of ﬁrst public in-
formation and that there is little uncertainty left due to the risk of shareholders blocking
the management plan to reincorporate as an SE. Our multivariate analysis conﬁrms this
view, which is therefore also not reported in this article but is available upon request.
Table 1, Panel B shows the results around the ofﬁcial incorporation date, which allows
us to examine whether reincorporations suffer from uncertainty. We again used the same
set of tests to investigate the price reactions around the incorporation date. We found that
the CARs are on average positive and statistically signiﬁcant 10days (5,+5) around the
incorporation date, consistent with the stock market reaction around the ﬁrst public infor-
mation. For the periods before and after the incorporation date, we ﬁnd that the market
often reacts positively and mostly statistically signiﬁcantly over the periods following
the date of SE incorporation. One possible reason for a second stock price reaction at
the incorporation date could be a partial overlap with the ﬁrst public information about
the reincorporation. While these overlaps are extremely rare (only a single case), in some
cases public information about the SE incorporation is only announced after the ﬁrm had
changed its legal form. As these cases are not completely unusual, we directly control for
Table 1: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Around the First Public Information and
the Date of Registration
Panel A: First public information Panel B: Date of registration
t-test Wilcoxon rank–sum
test
t-test Wilcoxon rank–sum
test
Average
CAR
t-value p-value z-value p-value Average
CAR
t-value p-value z-value p-value
1 to +1 0.0020 0.934 (0.267) 0.878 (0.238) 0.0023 0.820 (0.527) 0.836 (0.284)
2 to +2 0.0013 0.621 (0.322) 0.715 (0.311) 0.0018 0.504 (0.470) 0.535 (0.365)
3 to +3 0.0024 1.092 (0.344) 1.052 (0.311) 0.0022 0.637 (0.320) 0.533 (0.394)
4 to +4 0.0060 1.450 (0.142) 1.499 (0.115) 0.0037 1.126 (0.370) 0.584 (0.358)
5 to +5 0.0045 1.951 (0.041) 1.980 (0.042) 0.0092 2.590 (0.030) 2.660 (0.022)
5 to 0 0.0030 1.308 (0.341) 1.311 (0.324) 0.0057 1.683 (0.070) 1.684 (0.081)
4 to 0 0.0020 0.822 (0.431) 0.898 (0.344) 0.0027 0.818 (0.251) 0.545 (0.151)
3 to 0 0.0025 1.314 (0.351) 1.190 (0.343) 0.0048 1.359 (0.141) 1.403 (0.133)
2 to 0 0.0007 0.367 (0.514) 0.353 (0.419) 0.0039 1.168 (0.290) 1.165 (0.261)
1 to 0 0.0026 1.475 (0.161) 1.395 (0.178) 0.0074 2.177 (0.031) 2.537 (0.031)
0 0.0060 1.672 (0.079) 1.653 (0.052) 0.0024 0.690 (0.396) 0.889 (0.329)
0 to 1 0.0030 0.863 (0.590) 0.522 (0.410) 0.0080 2.080 (0.038) 2.693 (0.025)
0 to 2 0.0054 1.643 (0.102) 0.488 (0.481) 0.0041 1.242 (0.227) 1.160 (0.272)
0 to 3 0.0016 0.452 (0.521) 0.611 (0.392) 0.0045 1.515 (0.174) 1.589 (0.183)
0 to 4 0.0045 1.152 (0.410) 0.711 (0.385) 0.0091 2.397 (0.037) 2.845 (0.016)
0 to 5 0.0091 2.375 (0.030) 2.799 (0.040) 0.0033 0.986 (0.543) 0.770 (0.621)
0 to 100 0.0030 1.983 (0.042) 2.104 (0.027) 0.0055 1.954 (0.046) 1.956 (0.048)
0 to 200 0.0029 1.631 (0.117) 1.611 (0.110) 0.0031 1.463 (0.161) 1.521 (0.136)
Note: Average CARs for different windows around the ﬁrst public information of reincorporation and registration date, fol-
lowing the calculation presented in section II. The values reported are based on the full sample of 101 cases where the date
of the shareholder meeting could be identiﬁed. t-tests and Wilcoxon rank–sum tests are based on whether the CAR values
are signiﬁcantly different from 0.
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this fact in our multivariate analysis. Finally, we found positive and signiﬁcant CARs
over a long window after the SE incorporation.
Table 2 shows summary statistics of our ﬁnal sample. Due to missing data for the event
date and some of the explanatory variables, our sample for the multivariate analysis on the
ﬁrst public information contains 118 observations. The average CAR for the ﬁrst public
information about the SE incorporation is 0.001 for the (3,+3) window, with large
variation around the mean. Overall, 14.4% of the incorporations involve a merger, which
often involved a shell company to fulﬁl the cross-border requirements of the SE regula-
tion. German companies represent 51.7% of the sample. In terms of ﬁrm-level character-
istics, we found that 16.9% of the incorporations involve a change in the registered ofﬁce.
Moreover, 18.6% change their board structure from the two-tier structure to the one-tier
structure, and 36.4% potentially freeze worker participation. Note that most of these
companies do not appear to be close to the employee threshold level that requires
board-level worker participation or enhanced board-level worker participation. Moreover,
these factors are not mutually exclusive, as an incorporation may be driven by more than
one factor.
III. Main Results
Our main objective was to study which factors affect the stock price reaction to the ﬁrst
public information related to the SE incorporation. Further, we aimed to investigate
whether any follow-up stock price reaction occurs at the time of the shareholder meeting
or the formal registration. To this extent, we ran ordinary least squares regressions on our
ﬁnancial performance measure CAR(3,+3). Note that this approach captures only the
stock market reaction of ﬁrms that decided to reincorporate as an SE. Thus, we considered
a selective sample of ﬁrms for which the decision to reincorporate was apparently
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Main Variables
Variable No. of obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Dependent variable
(1) CAR 3 to +3 118 0.001 0.045 0.092 0.184
Control variables
(2) Ln (employees) 118 7.167 2.760 0 12.284
(3) Merger dummy 118 0.144 0.353 0 1
Country-level variables
(4) Dualism only dummy 118 0.559 0.499 0 1
(5) Monism only dummy 118 0.059 0.237 0 1
(6) Extent worker participation 118 0.365 0.165 0 0.500
(7) Previous incorporations of
publicly listed SEs
118 21.322 22.624 0 72
Firm-level variables
(8) Change of seat dummy 118 0.169 0.377 0 1
(9) Dualism to monism dummy 118 0.186 0.391 0 1
(10) Worker participation below
highest threshold dummy
118 0.364 0.483 0 1
Note: Variables reported are based on the full sample of 118 cases. CAR, cumulative abnormal returns; Obs, observations;
SD, standard deviation; SE, Societas Europaea.
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valuable. Moreover, we cannot disentangle whether the legal form of the SE or whether
the fact that the market has learned something about the nature of the ﬁrm is driving
the CARs. Given these caveats, our analyses still enable us to determine what the factors
of value creation are, although these factors may not hold for all ﬁrms alike.
The results are reported in Table 3, Panel A for CARs based on the ﬁrst public
information about the incorporation. Our initial results show that country-level regulation
affects stock performance. The stock price reaction is positive when the company is lo-
cated in a country that allows only a two-tier board structure under national corporate
law, such as Germany and Austria.5 By contrast, we do not ﬁnd evidence that the new
ﬂexibility to choose the one-tier board structure affects a ﬁrm’s value in a statistically
signiﬁcant manner. Furthermore, investors react positively when the company is located
in a country with higher levels of mandatory board-level worker participation, although
this relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant in Model 6.
At the ﬁrm level, a strong factor affecting stock price reaction is a transfer of the reg-
istered ofﬁce, which is also economically signiﬁcant. Controlling for other factors, the
change of the registered ofﬁce increases CARs by 2.0–3.3%, depending on the speciﬁca-
tion considered. As mentioned earlier, there may be different motives for changing the
registered ofﬁce. Below we examine some of these factors in more detail. Other reasons
for incorporating as an SE, such as changing to a one-tier board structure and freezing
worker participation, have no meaningful impact on stock prices. One possible reason
why freezing worker participation is not signiﬁcant is that most companies in our sample
are not close to the employee threshold level that requires board-level worker participa-
tion or enhanced board-level worker participation under national co-determination laws.
Similarly, ﬁrm size (ln [employees]) and incorporation as a result of a merger (the dummy
merger) also have no impact.6
Next, we investigated whether there was a second stock price reaction either at the time
of the shareholder meeting or the formal incorporation, since the ﬁrst public information
may still entail uncertainty whether the ﬁrm eventually gets registered. As pointed out
earlier, both events may lead to the resolution of remaining uncertainty about the ﬁnal
structure of the SE and whether the transformation actually takes place. Our data enabled
us to disentangle both factors. To investigate the effect of uncertainty surrounding the
shareholder meeting, we ran the same regressions as before but now with CARs centred
around the shareholder meeting date. None of the variables are statistically signiﬁcant in
any of the speciﬁcations. These ﬁndings suggest that the absence of uncertainty related to
shareholder support. This result is consistent with the fact that we observed very few
companies in our sample that announced the reincorporation, but did not put it on the
agenda of an upcoming shareholder meeting. The fact that we found no effect suggests
that shareholders are unlikely to reject the reincorporation.
To investigate the effect of the remaining uncertainty at the time of formal registration
we used CARs centred on the formal incorporation date. The results are provided in
5This effect disappears once we include a dummy variable for Germany or take Germany out of the sample. Whilst this ﬁnd-
ing indicates that the positive effect of a one-tier board structure is mostly driven by German ﬁrms, the lack of statistical
signiﬁcance may also stem from a lack of statistical power as a result of the small number of observations.
6In unreported regressions we included ﬁrm-level controls such as total assets, market capitalization, shares outstanding,
Tobin’s Q, total liabilities and shareholder equity. None of these variables was signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst public information
and only Tobin’s Q was signiﬁcant for the date of registration. Importantly, our previous results remain unaffected.
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Table 3, Panel B. We found that the impact of extent of worker participation and change
of seat was even stronger than at the time of the ﬁrst public information about the
reincorporation.
As mentioned in Section II, the stock price reactions can be attributed to the
confounding effect of both the ﬁrst public information about the reincorporation and
the effective incorporation, since in some cases both events occur with a few days. To
separate the two effects, we re-ran the analysis for the subsample of companies where
the two events did not overlap and the incorporation follows the ﬁrst public information
about the reincorporation. This allowed to estimate the impact of uncertainty resolution at
the time of effective incorporation. We obtained very similar results, which are available
upon request. Thus, while the market reacts positively to companies transferring their reg-
istered ofﬁce and in countries with strong worker participation, the simple announcement
of incorporating as an SE still entails signiﬁcant uncertainty in these cases.
Furthermore, we extended our analysis by investigating the actual content of the ﬁrst
public information of the SE incorporation. We found that companies frequently gave
four different reasons for an SE reincorporation: an intention to change the board structure
(12%), which in all cases aimed at a one-tier board structure, a change of seat (8%), sim-
plifying the legal structure (11%) and the Europeanization/internationalization strategy of
the company (26%). However, none of these statements showed a statistically signiﬁcant
effect in our regressions. Also, none changed our original ﬁndings.7
The fact that change of seat is also signiﬁcant at the time of formal registration is
striking and warrants extra analysis. As mentioned in Section I, transferring the registered
ofﬁce to another country may be driven by various arbitrage opportunities, including cor-
porate income taxes.8 Table 4 shows the origin and destination of seat transfers for the
7The regressions are available upon request from the authors.
8For some ﬁrms, like Norwegian Prosafe SE, very speciﬁc taxes such as national tonnage tax system for shipping compa-
nies may have been essential for transferring the registered ofﬁce.
Table 4: Change of Registered Ofﬁce and Tax Differentials (no. of companies)
Origin Destination
France 6 Luxembourg 6
Netherlands 4 UK 4
Luxembourg 3 Austria 2
Norway 2 Cyprus 2
UK 2 Malta 2
Finland 1 Belgium 1
Germany 1 Czech Republic 1
Hungary 1 Germany 1
Ireland 1 Hungary 1
Poland 1 Ireland 1
Poland 1
Average corporate income tax rate 27.5% Average corporate income tax rate 21.8%
Difference 5.7% (P= 0.013)
Note: Jurisdiction of origin and destination of Societas Europaeas that changed their registered ofﬁce. For each column
(origin, destination), we report the average corporate income tax rate in the year the registered ofﬁce was transferred. The last
row reports the result of a difference-in-mean test between the two average corporate income tax rates (p-value in brackets).
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SEs included in our sample and analysis. Many companies come from France and the
largest fraction relocates to Luxembourg or the UK. To assess whether tax differentials
could be a motive, we also show in Table 4 average corporate income tax rates (KPMG,
2015; OECD, 2016) in the respective jurisdictions of origin and destination. The evidence
suggests that corporate taxes in the countries of origin were signiﬁcantly higher (27.5%)
relative to the destination countries (21.8%) and the difference of 5.7% is statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 5% level (P=0.013). Likewise, we found the corporate income tax differ-
ential as calculated for each individual transfer of the registered ofﬁce separately (that is,
the difference between the tax rate in the country of origin and destination) was signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero (P=0.017).
An alternative possibility that could explain value creation during the transfer of the
registered ofﬁce is improvements due to better corporate control or a better corporate
law. After inspecting annual reports and corporate documentations speciﬁc to the SE
reincorporation and transfer of registered ofﬁce, we found that some companies argue that
the choice to transfer the registered ofﬁce is due to the location of the operations, which is
not (or no longer) in their current home jurisdiction. Hence, companies attempt to relocate
their registered ofﬁce closer to their operational facilities. Thus, some of the transfers may
indeed be driven by incentives to optimize the structure of international operations and
improving corporate control to expand the company internationally. The data available
to us do not allow to test this motive but future research could shed light on this alterna-
tive driver of value creation.
Conclusions
This study examined the economic impact of Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 that
allows companies located in one of the European Economic Area Member States to adopt
an SE as a supranational corporate form. The corporate beneﬁts of the SE depend largely
on whether arbitrage opportunities exist relative to the existing national corporate law
with regard to board structure and worker participation, or whether the management
planned to transfer the registered ofﬁce. While we document stock price reactions at the
time of ﬁrst public information about the reincorporation, we also document some stock
price reactions at the time of the formal incorporation but not at the time of the share-
holder meeting where shareholders approve the decision. This suggests that uncertainty
remains at the time managers decide to promote the reincorporation as an SE and that this
uncertainty is resolved only when the company formally registers.
Future research could explore the impact on how reincorporating as an SE affects
operating activities, the locations of subsidiaries and, ultimately, operating perfor-
mance. While our investigation has uncovered anecdotal evidence that operating activ-
ities may be affected and that this may inﬂuence the decision to relocate the registered
ofﬁce to another jurisdiction, future research could quantify the economic impact. This
may shed light on the long-term impact of SE reincorporations. Finally, the SE regu-
lation offers one option to existing European ﬁrms to change their registered ofﬁce,
while the Merger Directive is another alternative. Future research could investigate
which of the two options provides the more efﬁcient alternative for European ﬁrms
to transfer their registered ofﬁce.
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